Antitrust Screening: Making Compliance Programs Robust

11 Pages Posted: 26 Jul 2010

See all articles by Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz

Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz

Berkeley Research Group, LLC

Patrick Bajari

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Joe Murphy

Independent

Date Written: July 26, 2010

Abstract

One of the prime issues in the antitrust and competition law1 compliance field is how to deal with the risk of collusive or cartel behavior which involves willful violations of the law. In the past much of antitrust compliance work has focused on training, perhaps accompanied by an antitrust compliance manual. But regardless of the amount of employee training they conduct and the existence of written materials, it is likely that most practitioners feel they do not have a handle on this area of risk. In this paper we discuss the role that empirical screens for conspiracies and manipulations can play in assisting compliance programs, by looking at certain quantifiable red flags and applying statistical analysis to determine priority areas which merit further focus.

Keywords: Screens, Conspiracies, Manipulations, Detection, Investigations, Compliance Programs, Internal Monitoring

JEL Classification: C32, K21, K22

Suggested Citation

Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M. and Bajari, Patrick and Murphy, Joseph E., Antitrust Screening: Making Compliance Programs Robust (July 26, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1648948 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1648948

Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz (Contact Author)

Berkeley Research Group, LLC ( email )

Miami, FL
United States

Patrick Bajari

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Economics ( email )

611 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1220
United States
734-763-5319 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~bajari/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Joseph E. Murphy

Independent ( email )

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