Existence of Equilibria in All-Pay Auctions

Stanford Graduate School of Business Research Paper Series No. 2058

15 Pages Posted: 28 Jul 2010

See all articles by Srihari Govindan

Srihari Govindan

University of Rochester

Robert Wilson

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Date Written: July 28, 2010

Abstract

For an all-pay sealed-bid auction of an item for which each bidder's realized value can depend on every bidder's privately observed signal, existence of equilibria in behavioral strategies is established using only the assumption that bidders' value functions and the density function of signals are positive and continuous on a product of intervals. Such equilibria have atomless distributions of bids and thus are not affected by how tied bids are resolved.

Keywords: auctions, economic theory

JEL Classification: C72, D44

Suggested Citation

Govindan, Srihari and Wilson, Robert B., Existence of Equilibria in All-Pay Auctions (July 28, 2010). Stanford Graduate School of Business Research Paper Series No. 2058, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1650291 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1650291

Srihari Govindan (Contact Author)

University of Rochester ( email )

Department of Economics
Rochester, NY NY 14627
United States
5852757214 (Phone)

Robert B. Wilson

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-723-8620 (Phone)
650-725-7979 (Fax)

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