The Value of Patents in Industry Standards: Avoiding License Arbitrage with Voluntary Rules

AIPLA Quarterly Journal, Vol. 36, No.1, Spring 2008

41 Pages Posted: 29 Jul 2010 Last revised: 29 Dec 2013

See all articles by Justin (Gus) Hurwitz

Justin (Gus) Hurwitz

University of Nebraska at Lincoln - College of Law; International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE)

Date Written: July 28, 2010

Abstract

This Article looks at the role that compulsory compensation rules for patent infringement play in creating patent hold-ups. It argues that patent hold-ups of industry standards can best be avoided by channeling patentees into voluntary negotiations with industry groups. This requires reworking compulsory compensation rules, so that patentees don't have strong incentives to create hold-up situations, which in turn means better defining compulsory compensation rules such that they yield royalties that are in line with what we would expect to see in voluntary negotiation. The paper suggests an initial economic framework and procedural mechanisms to reach this end.

[Winner of Jones Day 2007 Swope Prize Antitrust Writing Competition] [NB: This version may contain non-substantive differences from the version as published]

Suggested Citation

Hurwitz, Justin (Gus), The Value of Patents in Industry Standards: Avoiding License Arbitrage with Voluntary Rules (July 28, 2010). AIPLA Quarterly Journal, Vol. 36, No.1, Spring 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1650375 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1650375

Justin (Gus) Hurwitz (Contact Author)

University of Nebraska at Lincoln - College of Law ( email )

103 McCollum Hall
P.O. Box 830902
Lincoln, NE 68583-0902
United States

International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) ( email )

5005 SW Meadows Rd.
Suite 300
Lake Oswego, OR 97035
United States

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