Joint Liability Lending and Credit Risk: Evidence from the Home Equity Market

19 Pages Posted: 2 Aug 2010

See all articles by Sumit Agarwal

Sumit Agarwal

National University of Singapore

Brent W. Ambrose

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Insurance & Real Estate

Souphala Chomsisengphet

Government of the United States of America - Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)

Chunlin Liu

University of Nevada, Reno - College of Business

Date Written: July 30, 2010

Abstract

Using a unique dataset of home equity credit contracts, we examine the benefits of joint liability lending. Our results show that the risk of default for joint borrowers with similar risk scores is significantly lower than the risk associated with single borrowers. However, when joint borrowers have divergent risk scores, the risk of default is higher than the single borrowers. Our results indicate that the lower risk associated with joint liability is largely dependent upon the similarity of risk characteristics (profiles) of the joint borrowers. Our results suggest that joint liability lending per say does not reduce credit risk.

Keywords: Consumer Credit, Mortgages, Micro-finance, Information Asymmetry, household finance

JEL Classification: G21, D12, D14

Suggested Citation

Agarwal, Sumit and Ambrose, Brent W. and Chomsisengphet, Souphala and Liu, Chunlin, Joint Liability Lending and Credit Risk: Evidence from the Home Equity Market (July 30, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1651306 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1651306

Sumit Agarwal (Contact Author)

National University of Singapore ( email )

15 Kent Ridge Drive
Singapore, 117592
Singapore
8118 9025 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ushakrisna.com

Brent W. Ambrose

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Insurance & Real Estate ( email )

Smeal College of Business,
Penn State University
University Park, PA US-0-PA 16802
United States
8148670066 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.psu.edu/brentwambrose/

Souphala Chomsisengphet

Government of the United States of America - Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) ( email )

400 7th Street SW
Washington, DC 20219
United States

Chunlin Liu

University of Nevada, Reno - College of Business ( email )

University of Nevada, Reno
Reno, NV 89557-0016
United States

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