Insurers' Negotiating Leverage and the External Effects of Medicare Part D
45 Pages Posted: 10 Aug 2010 Last revised: 27 Nov 2024
Date Written: August 2010
Abstract
Public financing of private health insurance may generate external effects beyond the subsidized population, by influencing the size and bargaining power of health insurers. We test for this external effect in the context of Medicare Part D. We analyze how Part D-related insurer size increases impacted retail drug prices negotiated by insurers for their non-Part D commercial market. On average, Part D lowered retail prices for commercial insureds by 5.8% to 8.5%. The cost-savings to the commercial market amount to $3bn per year, which approximates the total annual savings experienced by Part D beneficiaries who previously lacked drug coverage.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
The Tobit Model with a Non-Zero Threshold
By Richard T. Carson and Yixiao Sun
-
The Effect of Ignoring Heteroscedasticity on Estimates of the Tobit Model
By Charles Brown and Robert A. Moffitt
-
Value-Added to What? How a Ceiling in the Testing Instrument Influences Value-Added Estimation
By Cory Koedel and Julian R. Betts
-
Value-Added to What? How a Ceiling in the Testing Instrument Influences Value-Added Estimation
By Cory Koedel and Julian R. Betts
-
Value-Added Measures in Italian High Schools: Problems and Findings
By Piero Cipollone, Pasqualino Montanaro, ...
-
A Non-Experimental Evaluation of Curricular Effectiveness in Math
By Rachana R. Bhatt and Cory Koedel
-
By Kenji Adachi and Yoshifumi Konishi
-
Insurer Bargaining and Negotiated Drug Prices in Medicare Part D
By Darius N. Lakdawalla and Wesley Yin
-
By Paolo Sestito and Marco Tonello