A Study of Non-Neutral Networks

8 Pages Posted: 8 Aug 2010  

Eitan Altman

Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et Automatique (INRIA)

Pierre Bernhard

Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et Automatique (INRIA)

George Kesidis

Pennsylvania State University

Sulan Wong

University of Coruña - Faculty of Law

Julio Rojas-Mora

University of Barcelona - Department of Business Economics and Organization

Date Written: August 6, 2010

Abstract

Hahn and Wallsten wrote that net neutrality "usually means that broadband service providers charge consumers only once for Internet access, do not favor one content provider over another, and do not charge content providers for sending information over broadband lines to end users." In this paper we study the implications of being non-neutral, particularly by charging the content providers. Using game theoretic tools, we show that by adding the option for the service providers to charge the content providers, not only may the content providers and the internauts suffer, but also the access provider's performance degrades.

Keywords: Network neutrality, side payments, game theory

JEL Classification: C72, L50, D40, L96

Suggested Citation

Altman, Eitan and Bernhard, Pierre and Kesidis, George and Wong, Sulan and Rojas-Mora, Julio, A Study of Non-Neutral Networks (August 6, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1654306 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1654306

Eitan Altman

Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et Automatique (INRIA) ( email )

BP93 2004 Route des Lucioles
Sophia Antipolis Cedex, 06902
France

Pierre Bernhard

Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et Automatique (INRIA) ( email )

40 avenue Halley
Villeneuve, 59650

George Kesidis

Pennsylvania State University ( email )

University Park
State College, PA 16802
United States

Sulan Wong

University of Coruña - Faculty of Law ( email )

Campus de Elviña
A Coruña, 15071
Spain

Julio Rojas-Mora (Contact Author)

University of Barcelona - Department of Business Economics and Organization ( email )

Edificio Principal, Torre 2 - 3a planta
Av. Diagonal, 690
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/jcredberry/

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