Strategic Behavior of Experienced Subjects in a Common Pool Resource Game

Posted: 14 Jul 1999

See all articles by Claudia Keser

Claudia Keser

University of Goettingen (Göttingen)

Roy Gardner

Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Economics; Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) - Department of Economics

Abstract

This paper describes the results of an experiment applying the strategy method to analyze the behavior of subjects in an 8-player common pool resource (CPR) game. The CPR game consists of a constituent game played for 20 periods. The CPR game has a unique optimum and a unique subgame perfect equilibrium; the latter involves overinvestment in the appropriation from the CPR. Sixteen students, all experienced in game theory, were recruited to play the CPR game over the course of 6 weeks. In the first phase of the experiment, they played the CPR game on-line 3 times. In the second phase of the experiment, the tournament phase, they designed strategies which were then played against each other. At the aggregate level, subgame perfect equilibrium organizes the data fairly well. At the individual level, however, fewer than 5% of subjects play in accordance with the game equilibrium prediction.

JEL Classification: C70, C91

Suggested Citation

Keser, Claudia and Gardner, Roy John, Strategic Behavior of Experienced Subjects in a Common Pool Resource Game. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=165455

Claudia Keser

University of Goettingen (Göttingen) ( email )

Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3
Göttingen, 37073
Germany

Roy John Gardner (Contact Author)

Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Economics ( email )

Wylie Hall
Bloomington, IN 47405-6620
United States

Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) - Department of Economics ( email )

Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
812-855-6383 (Phone)
812-855-3736 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
695
PlumX Metrics