Depoliticizing Financial Regulation

92 Pages Posted: 7 Aug 2010

See all articles by Steven A. Ramirez

Steven A. Ramirez

Loyola University of Chicago School of Law

Date Written: 2000

Abstract

Regulation can be secured against the pernicious influence of those holding concentrated economic resources. The legal structure of an administrative agency matters. The Federal Reserve's administration of monetary policy exemplifies the possibility or regulation based upon sound policy rather than the needs of special interests. On the other hand, the SEC has consistently catered to the corporate and financial elites it is supposed to regulate. The difference is legal structure, including, funding source, terms, post-employment restrictions, and pay, as well as factors traditionally associated with agency independence. Agencies should be structured with a view towards the need for depoliticized regulation, in the financial sector or otherwise.

Suggested Citation

Ramirez, Steven A., Depoliticizing Financial Regulation (2000). William & Mary Law Review, Vol. 41, p. 503, February 2000; Loyola University Chicago School of Law Research Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1655045

Steven A. Ramirez (Contact Author)

Loyola University of Chicago School of Law ( email )

25 E. Pearson
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

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