Runaway CEO Pay? Blame the Boards

The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance, Vol. IX, No. 3, pp. 7-27, July 2010

Posted: 10 Aug 2010

See all articles by Franklin Strier

Franklin Strier

California State University at Dominguez Hills

Date Written: July 2010

Abstract

This study analyzes the problem of high or runaway CEO pay packages. These packages reflect substantial lapses of corporate governance by the corporate boards of directors that award the excessive pay. A combination of shareholder impotence, director self-interest and CEO domination has rendered many board directors favorably disposed — if not beholden — to overpay their corporation’s CEO at the expense of the stakeholders. The study parses the factors contributing to these breaches of board fiduciary duties, and suggests a variety of mutually compatible remedies to policymakers in the US and Europe.

Suggested Citation

Strier, Franklin, Runaway CEO Pay? Blame the Boards (July 2010). The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance, Vol. IX, No. 3, pp. 7-27, July 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1655639

Franklin Strier (Contact Author)

California State University at Dominguez Hills ( email )

1000 E. Victoria St.
Carson, CA 90747
United States
310-243-3830 (Phone)
310-516-4418 (Fax)

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