Price Discrimination Based on Downstream Regulation: Evidence from the Market for SO2 Scrubbers
Center for Competition Policy Working Paper No. 10-9
ESRC Centre for Competition Policy Working Paper
30 Pages Posted: 12 Aug 2010
Date Written: July 9, 2010
Abstract
Evidence from the market for flue-gas desulfurization devices [scrubbers] in the U.S. is used to show that the choice and stringency of environmental regulation have substantial effects on the mark-up of an abatement technology. The imperfectly competitive upstream eco-industry charges higher prices for scrubbers to power plants participating in Phase I of the tradable permit scheme for sulphur dioxide than to those subject to emission standards. The mark-up also depends on stringency of the emission standard, geographic location and electricity market regulation. Previous empirical studies neglect this source of endogeneity. Market power and price discrimination have repercussions on the rate of diffusion and innovation incentives.
Keywords: Price Discrimination, Emission Standards, Tradable, Permits, Technology Diffusion
JEL Classification: L13, Q52, Q58, L94
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
Pollution Abatement Investment When Environmental Regulation is Uncertain
By Y. Hossein Farzin and Peter M. Kort
-
Vertical Structure and Strategic Environmental Trade Policy
By Stephen F. Hamilton and Till Requate
-
Environmental Taxation and International Eco-Industries
By Joan Canton
-
By Joan Canton
-
Environmental Regulation and Horizontal Mergers in the Eco-Industry
By Joan Canton, Maia David, ...