Reciprocity and Barter in Peer-to-Peer Systems

The 29th Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM)

9 Pages Posted: 11 Aug 2010

See all articles by Daniel Sadoc Menasche

Daniel Sadoc Menasche

University of Massachusetts Amherst

Laurent Massoulié

Technicolor Paris Labs

Don Towsley

University of Massachusetts Amherst

Date Written: March 15, 2010

Abstract

This work investigates reciprocity in peer-to-peer systems. The scenario is one where users arrive to the network with a set of contents and content demands. Peers exchange contents to satisfy their demands, following either a direct reciprocity principle (I help you and you help me) or indirect reciprocity principle (I help you and someone helps me). First, we prove that any indirect reciprocity schedule of exchanges, in the absence of relays, can be replaced by a direct reciprocity schedule, provided that users (1) are willing to download undemanded content for bartering purposes and (2) use up to twice the bandwidth they would use under indirect reciprocity. Motivated by the fact that, in the absence of relays, the loss of efficiency due to direct reciprocity is at most two, we study various distributed direct reciprocity schemes through simulations, some of them involving a broker to facilitate exchanges.

Keywords: reciprocity, barter, peer-to-peer, graphs, flows

Suggested Citation

Menasche, Daniel Sadoc and Massoulié, Laurent and Towsley, Don, Reciprocity and Barter in Peer-to-Peer Systems (March 15, 2010). The 29th Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1657185

Daniel Sadoc Menasche (Contact Author)

University of Massachusetts Amherst ( email )

Department of Operations and Information Managemen
Amherst, MA 01003
United States

Laurent Massoulié

Technicolor Paris Labs ( email )

1, rue Jeanne d'Arc
92443 Issy-les-Moulineaux cede
France
+33 1 41 86 69 15 (Phone)

Don Towsley

University of Massachusetts Amherst ( email )

Department of Operations and Information Managemen
Amherst, MA 01003
United States

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