Bundled Discounts as Competition for Distribution

GCP – The Online Magazine For Global Competition Policy, June 2008

9 Pages Posted: 9 Jul 2011

See all articles by Benjamin Klein

Benjamin Klein

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics; Compass Lexecon

Date Written: June 1, 2008

Abstract

The antitrust law of bundled discounts is unsettled. LePage’s broadly condemned bundled discounts instituted by a dominant firm where it appeared that the discounts served no economic purpose other than to place rival, single product suppliers at a competitive disadvantage. In contrast, PeaceHealth more recently proposed a less restrictive standard, requiring for antitrust liability that the firm’s attributed price, allocating all discounts on the entire bundle of products to the rival’s product, be less than the firm’s costs of producing that product.

JEL Classification: L42, K21

Suggested Citation

Klein, Benjamin, Bundled Discounts as Competition for Distribution (June 1, 2008). GCP – The Online Magazine For Global Competition Policy, June 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1657206

Benjamin Klein (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics ( email )

1999 Avenue of the Stars
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HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/people/Faculty/Klein.html

Compass Lexecon ( email )

1999 Avenue of the Stars
Suite 1150
Los Angeles, CA 90067-4628
United States
310-728-2025 (Phone)
310-728-2070 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.compasslexecon.com/professionals/bio?id=152

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