All of the Economic Aid the U.S., EU, and Japan Give to the Developing World is Stolen Back by Our Illegal Price-Fixing Cartels

10 Pages Posted: 12 Aug 2010

See all articles by Robert H. Lande

Robert H. Lande

University of Baltimore - School of Law

Date Written: August 10, 2010

Abstract

This compares the magnitudes of two forms of economic interaction between the developed and developing world. The first is the amount of economic foreign aid provided by the developed world to the developing world during a single year. The second is an estimate of the yearly amount that illegal price fixing cartels, comprised of companies from the U.S., the EU, and Japan, overcharge – steal! – from purchasers in these same countries. This comparison shows these amounts are roughly equivalent. If anything, cartels probably steal more from the developing world than the developed world gives them in economic assistance.

This means that all of the economic foreign assistance that developed countries provide to the developing world, or its equivalent, is illegally stolen back by the developing world's companies. The devastating effects of these cartels means, in effect, that the developing world gives no net economic foreign aid to the developed world. This conclusion has a number of implications.

This is very much a work in progress. Suggestions are most welcome, to rlande@ubalt.edu. I have posted two versions of this thesis. The first was prepared for a speech. The second is the start of an article, but it is only an undeveloped skeleton, with many parts needing to be developed.

Keywords: foreign aid, foreign assistance, economic development, cartel, cartel overcharge, overcharge, theft, price fixing, economic aid, development assistance, international antitrust, antitrust penalties, economic assistance

JEL Classification: K21, K29, K33, K39, K49, L40, L43, L49

Suggested Citation

Lande, Robert H., All of the Economic Aid the U.S., EU, and Japan Give to the Developing World is Stolen Back by Our Illegal Price-Fixing Cartels (August 10, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1657673 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1657673

Robert H. Lande (Contact Author)

University of Baltimore - School of Law ( email )

1420 N. Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 21218
United States

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