Management Control Practices and Relative Bargaining Power – The Interrelationships and Dynamics

31 Pages Posted: 16 Aug 2010

See all articles by Pingli Li

Pingli Li

Southampton Business School, University of Southampton

Guliang Tang

University of International Business and Economics

Hirosh Okano

Independent

Gao Chen

Independent

Date Written: July 25, 2010

Abstract

This paper examines the characteristics of management controls exercised by parents and the ways such controls could be shaped by relative bargaining power of parents in international joint ventures (IJVs). Adopting an in-depth case study method in a large automotive IJV formed between a Chinese and Japanese partner, the study focuses on not just what but also how management controls have been exercised in the case company. The paper contributes to the literature on management controls and IJVs by providing systematic study of the interrelationships between the multiple dimensions of management controls, through which a shared but split control style was identified. In addition, it provides the first observation of the evolutionary changes in management controls due to the dynamics of relative bargaining power, and of the ways exercising relative bargaining power mediates the extent of control between the partners. The findings also have important implications concerning how to enhance the effectiveness of management controls over IJVs.

Keywords: Management controls, Bargaining power, International joint venture, China, Automotive Industry

JEL Classification: C78, D23, F23, L62, M41

Suggested Citation

Li, Pingli and Tang, Guliang and Okano, Hirosh and Chen, Gao, Management Control Practices and Relative Bargaining Power – The Interrelationships and Dynamics (July 25, 2010). AAA 2011 Management Accounting Section (MAS) Meeting Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1658281 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1658281

Pingli Li (Contact Author)

Southampton Business School, University of Southampton ( email )

Highfield,
Southampton, SO17 1BJ
United Kingdom

Guliang Tang

University of International Business and Economics ( email )

No. 10, Huixin Dongjie, Chaoyang District
Beijing, 100029
China

Hirosh Okano

Independent ( email )

Gao Chen

Independent ( email )

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