Premium Pay for Executive Talent: An Empirical Analysis
48 Pages Posted: 14 Aug 2010 Last revised: 16 Nov 2010
Date Written: Nov 12, 2010
We examine the extent to which executive talent at the time of the hire affects the design of the executive’s compensation contract at the hiring firm. Using a sample of executives who switched jobs at least once between 1992 and 2007, we find that our proxies for executive talent are positively associated with compensation premiums at the new employer, after controlling for the standard determinants of pay. Moreover, tests for the association between pay for executive talent and performance at the hiring firm indicate that it does not always pay off to pay a premium to attract and retain talented executives, and that this association varies with the type of talent (i.e., “perceived” versus “objective”) the hiring firm rewards.
Keywords: Executive Talent, Compensation, Incentives
JEL Classification: J33
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