Bertrand-Edgeworth Auction with Multiple Asymmetric Bidders: The Case with Demand Elasticity

18 Pages Posted: 18 Aug 2010

See all articles by Shanshan Hu

Shanshan Hu

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Operation & Decision Technologies

Roman Kapuscinski

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

William S. Lovejoy

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Date Written: August 16, 2010

Abstract

In this technical note, we provide a complete proof of a theorem about the equilibrium structure in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Auction with demand elasticity. It is a companion to our full paper in B-E Auction (Hu, et al, 2010). The analysis in this note largely repeats the analysis in the original paper and is therefore not included there. As there are still sufficient differences with the original case without demand elasticity, we provide it here as an independent document for reader's convenience.

Suggested Citation

Hu, Shanshan and Kapuscinski, Roman and Lovejoy, William S., Bertrand-Edgeworth Auction with Multiple Asymmetric Bidders: The Case with Demand Elasticity (August 16, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1660114 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1660114

Shanshan Hu (Contact Author)

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Operation & Decision Technologies ( email )

Business 670
1309 E. Tenth Street
Bloomington, IN 47401
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812-856-2342 (Phone)

Roman Kapuscinski

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States

William S. Lovejoy

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States

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