Incentives, Resources and the Organization of the School System

37 Pages Posted: 24 Aug 2010

See all articles by Facundo Albornoz

Facundo Albornoz

University of Birmingham

Samuel Berlinski

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) - Research Department

Antonio Cabrales

University College London - Department of Economics

Date Written: August 2010

Abstract

We study a model where student e ort and talent interact with parental and teachers' investments, as well as with school system resources. The model is rich, yet sufficiently stylized to provide novel implications. We can show, for example, that an improvement in parental outside options will reduce parental and school effort, which are partially compensated through school resources. In this way we provide a rationale for the ambiguous existing empirical evidence on the effect of school resources. We also provide a novel microfoundation for peer effects, with empirical implications on welfare and on preferences for sorting across schools.

Keywords: education, parental effort, school resources

JEL Classification: I20, I21, I28

Suggested Citation

Albornoz, Facundo and Berlinski, Samuel and Cabrales, Antonio, Incentives, Resources and the Organization of the School System (August 2010). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7964. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1661567

Facundo Albornoz (Contact Author)

University of Birmingham ( email )

Economics Department
Birmingham, B15 2TT
United Kingdom

Samuel Berlinski

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) - Research Department ( email )

1300 New York Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20577
United States

Antonio Cabrales

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

Drayton House, 30 Gordon Street
30 Gordon Street
London, WC1H 0AX
United Kingdom

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