Natural Resource Distribution and Multiple Forms of Civil War

University of Zurich Institute for Empirical Research in Economics Working Paper No. 498

31 Pages Posted: 20 Aug 2010

Date Written: August 9, 2010

Abstract

We examine how natural resource location, rent sharing and fighting capacities of different groups matter for ethnic conflict. A new type of bargaining failure due to multiple types of potential conflicts (and hence multiple threat points) is identified. The theory predicts conflict to be more likely when the geographical distribution of natural resources is uneven and when a minority group has better chances to win a secessionist rather than a centrist conflict. For sharing rents, resource proportionality is salient in avoiding secessions and strength proportionality in avoiding centrist civil wars. We present empirical evidence that is consistent with the model.

Keywords: Natural Resources, Conflict, Strength Proportionality, Resource Proportionality, Secession, Bargaining Failure

JEL Classification: C72, D74, Q34

Suggested Citation

Morelli, Massimo and Rohner, Dominic, Natural Resource Distribution and Multiple Forms of Civil War (August 9, 2010). University of Zurich Institute for Empirical Research in Economics Working Paper No. 498 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1662434 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1662434

Massimo Morelli (Contact Author)

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

Dominic Rohner

University of Zurich ( email )

Muehlebachstrasse 86
Zurich, 8008
Switzerland

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