Natural Resource Distribution and Multiple Forms of Civil War
University of Zurich Institute for Empirical Research in Economics Working Paper No. 498
31 Pages Posted: 20 Aug 2010
Date Written: August 9, 2010
We examine how natural resource location, rent sharing and fighting capacities of different groups matter for ethnic conflict. A new type of bargaining failure due to multiple types of potential conflicts (and hence multiple threat points) is identified. The theory predicts conflict to be more likely when the geographical distribution of natural resources is uneven and when a minority group has better chances to win a secessionist rather than a centrist conflict. For sharing rents, resource proportionality is salient in avoiding secessions and strength proportionality in avoiding centrist civil wars. We present empirical evidence that is consistent with the model.
Keywords: Natural Resources, Conflict, Strength Proportionality, Resource Proportionality, Secession, Bargaining Failure
JEL Classification: C72, D74, Q34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation