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Corporate Governance When Founders are Directors

Journal of Financial Economics, Forthcoming

51 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2010 Last revised: 9 Jan 2011

Feng Li

Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance, Shanghai Jiaotong University

Suraj Srinivasan

Harvard Business School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 23, 2010

Abstract

We examine CEO compensation, CEO retention policies, and M&A decisions in firms where founders serve as a director with a non-founder CEO (founder-director firms). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEOs than other firms. Pay for performance sensitivity for non-founder CEOs in founder-director firms is higher and the level of pay is lower than that of other CEOs. CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance is also significantly higher in founder-director firms compared to non-founder firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that boards with founder-directors provide more high powered incentives in the form of pay and retention policies than the average U.S. board. Stock returns around M&A announcements and board attendance are also higher in founder-director firms compared to non-founder firms.

Keywords: Founder, CEO compensation, CEO turnover, family firms, corporate governance, board of directors

JEL Classification: G3, G34

Suggested Citation

Li, Feng and Srinivasan, Suraj, Corporate Governance When Founders are Directors (December 23, 2010). Journal of Financial Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1663905 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1663905

Feng Li

Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance, Shanghai Jiaotong University ( email )

211 West Huaihai Road
Shanghai, Shanghai 200030
China

Suraj Srinivasan (Contact Author)

Harvard Business School ( email )

Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States

HOME PAGE: http://drfd.hbs.edu/fit/public/facultyInfo.do?facInfo=pub&facId=10700

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