Security Baskets and Index-Linked Securities

39 Pages Posted: 24 Aug 2010

See all articles by Gary B. Gorton

Gary B. Gorton

Yale School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Yale University - Yale Program on Financial Stability

George Pennacchi

University of Illinois

Date Written: May 1991

Abstract

Security baskets and index-lined securities are securities whose values are functions of the cash flows or values of other assets. Creation of these "composite" securities would seem to be redundant since investors can cost1ess1y replicate them. In this paper we study the existence and optimal design of composite securities. We first show that when some investors possess inside information, composite securities are not redundant. By holding composite securities, uninformed investors with unexpected needs to trade can reduce their expected losses to insiders. The existence of these securities will affect real investment decisions. We then show that when uniformed investors are heterogeneous with respect to nontradeable endowment risk, the size of such clienteles determines whether the portfolio for a liquidity trader consists of a clientele-specific composite or a single market composite combined with individual security holdings. In the latter case, markets for the composite security and its component securities coexist. No results depend on the existence of exogenous "noise" traders.

Suggested Citation

Gorton, Gary B. and Pennacchi, George G., Security Baskets and Index-Linked Securities (May 1991). NBER Working Paper No. w3711, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1664245

Gary B. Gorton (Contact Author)

Yale School of Management ( email )

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P.O. Box 208200
New haven, CT 06511
United States

HOME PAGE: http://mba.yale.edu/faculty/profiles/gorton.shtml

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
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Yale University - Yale Program on Financial Stability

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P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States

George G. Pennacchi

University of Illinois ( email )

4041 BIF, Box 25
515 East Gregory Drive
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
217-244-0952 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.business.illinois.edu/gpennacc/

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