Minimizing Regret: The General Case

Tilburg University, CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 1998-41

Posted: 27 Sep 1999

See all articles by Aldo Rustichini

Aldo Rustichini

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Economics

Date Written: 1998

Abstract

In repeated games with differential information on one side, the labelling "general case" refers to games in which the action of the informed player is not known to the uninformed, who can only observe a signal which is the random outcome of his and his opponent's action. Here we consider the problem of minimizing regret (in the sense first formulated by Hannan [8]) when the information available is of this type. We give a simple condition describing the approachable set.

JEL Classification: C70, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Rustichini, Aldo, Minimizing Regret: The General Case (1998). Tilburg University, CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 1998-41. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=166461

Aldo Rustichini (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Economics ( email )

271 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

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