18 Pages Posted: 25 Aug 2010
Date Written: September 2010
Recent empirical contributions in labor economics suggest that individual firms face upward sloping labor supplies. We rationalize this by assuming that idiosyncratic non-pecuniary conditions interact with money wages in workers decisions to work for specific firms. Likewise, firms supply differentiated goods in response to differences in consumer tastes. Hence, firms are price-makers and wage-setters. By combining monopolistic and monopsonistic competition, our setting captures general equilibrium interactions between the two markets. The equilibrium involves double exploitation of labor. Compared to the competitive outcome, the high-productive workers are overpaid under free entry, whereas the low-productive workers are underpaid. In the same vein, capital-owners receive a premium, whereas workers are exploited.
Keywords: labor exploitation, monopolistic competition, monopsonistic competition, wage dispersion, worker heterogeneity
JEL Classification: D33, J31, J42, J71, L13
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Thisse, Jacques-François and Toulemonde, Eric, The Distribution of Earnings Under Monopsonistic/Polistic Competition (September 2010). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7981. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1664912
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