Pretrial Bargaining with Asymmetric Information and Endogenous Expenditure at Trial

31 Pages Posted: 26 Aug 2010

See all articles by Amy Farmer

Amy Farmer

University of Arkansas - Department of Economics

Paul Pecorino

University of Alabama - Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies

Date Written: August 1, 2010

Abstract

We develop a model with asymmetric information, where the uninformed party makes the offer. When parties proceed to trial, their endogenous expenditures partially determine the outcome. The endogenous spending at trial can either strengthen or weaken the bargaining position of the uninformed party with the player types who settle. When the bargaining position is strengthened, some standard results on information transmission prior to trial may be overturned. The recipient of the offer with a weak case may make a costly voluntary disclosure. In addition, the party making the offer may refuse costless discovery. Both of these results contrast with the standard results in the literature derived from models in which spending at trial is treated as exogenous.

Keywords: Pretrial Bargaining, Asymmetric Information, Endogenous Expenditure at Trial, Discovery, Disclosure

JEL Classification: K4, D8

Suggested Citation

Farmer, Amy and Pecorino, Paul, Pretrial Bargaining with Asymmetric Information and Endogenous Expenditure at Trial (August 1, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1665297 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1665297

Amy Farmer

University of Arkansas - Department of Economics ( email )

Fayetteville, AR 72701
United States
501-575-6093 (Phone)
501-575-3241 (Fax)

Paul Pecorino (Contact Author)

University of Alabama - Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies ( email )

P.O. Box 870244
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States
205-348-0379 (Phone)
205-348-0590 (Fax)

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