Bayesians Don’t Tell Knowledge-Lies (and Probably Nobody Else Does Either)

17 Pages Posted: 29 Aug 2010

Date Written: June 12, 2010

Abstract

Roy Sorensen (forthcoming) claims that there are lies that attack knowledge without attacking belief. Using the framework of Bayesianism, I argue that all of Sorensen's examples of knowledge-lies actually achieve the goal of the liar by altering people's beliefs in one way or another. Although Sorensen has not identified one, there may be philosophically interesting examples of knowledge-lies. I argue, however, that such lies can have no effect on people's behavior and, thus, no one (with the possible exception of philosophers) is likely to tell them.

Keywords: lying, knowledge, belief, degrees of belief, Bayesianism

Suggested Citation

Fallis, Don, Bayesians Don’t Tell Knowledge-Lies (and Probably Nobody Else Does Either) (June 12, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1666545 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1666545

Don Fallis (Contact Author)

Northeastern University ( email )

360 Huntington Ave,
Boston, MA 02115
United States

HOME PAGE: http://philpeople.org/profiles/don-fallis

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