Reciprocal Brokered Deposits and Bank Risk

CAMA Working Paper No. 15/2010

13 Pages Posted: 31 Aug 2010

Date Written: January 1, 2010

Abstract

Economic theory predicts that reciprocal brokered deposits, by facilitating an extension of deposit insurance coverage, may exacerbate moral hazard and reduce market discipline for banks, permitting them to take more risk in various dimensions. Using a newly available dataset, this note explores empirical evidence related to that hypothesis.

Keywords: reciprocal brokered deposits, moral hazard, bank risk

JEL Classification: G21

Suggested Citation

Shaffer, Sherrill, Reciprocal Brokered Deposits and Bank Risk (January 1, 2010). CAMA Working Paper No. 15/2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1668178 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1668178

Sherrill Shaffer (Contact Author)

University of Wyoming ( email )

P.O. Box 3985
Laramie, WY 82071-3985
United States
307-766-2173 (Phone)
307-766-5090 (Fax)

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