Endogenous Information Structures

Universitat Pompeu Fabra Department of Economics Working Paper No. 386

16 Pages Posted: 16 Aug 1999

See all articles by Sjaak Hurkens

Sjaak Hurkens

Institute for Economic Analysis-CSIC; Barcelona GSE

Nir Vulkan

University of Oxford - Said Business School

Date Written: April 1999

Abstract

Many models in the economics literature deal with strategic situations with privately informed agents. In those models the information structure is assumed to be exogenous and common knowledge. We consider whether such models, and the results they produce, are robust with respect the endogenization of the information structure. The results depend on whether information acquisition is secret or private, and on whether the strategic situation involves simultaneous or sequential moves. In particular we find that only when information is secretly acquired and moves are simultaneous, the results are fully robust. When information is acquired secretly but moves are sequential additional equilibria may appear. Instead, private information acquisition may make the equilibrium set smaller.

JEL Classification: D81, D82

Suggested Citation

Hurkens, J.P.M. (Sjaak) and Vulkan, Nir, Endogenous Information Structures (April 1999). Universitat Pompeu Fabra Department of Economics Working Paper No. 386. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=166837 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.166837

J.P.M. (Sjaak) Hurkens (Contact Author)

Institute for Economic Analysis-CSIC

campus UAB
Bellaterra, 08193
Spain

Barcelona GSE ( email )

Barcelona
Spain
(34-93) 5806612 (Phone)
(34-93) 5801452 (Fax)

Nir Vulkan

University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )

Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
+44 01865 288929, or 288338 (Phone)
+44 01865 288805 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: https://vulkan.worc.ox.ac.uk/

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