The Hotelling-Downs Model with Runoff Voting

38 Pages Posted: 4 Sep 2010 Last revised: 6 Sep 2010

See all articles by Sandro Brusco

Sandro Brusco

SUNY at Stony Brook University, College of Arts and Science, Department of Economics

Marcin Dziubiński

University of Warsaw - Institute of Informatics

Jaideep Roy

Deakin University - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 2, 2010

Abstract

We consider the Hotelling-Downs model with n ≥ 2 office seeking candidates and runoff voting. We show that Nash equilibria in pure strategies always exist and that there are typically multiple equilibria, both convergent (all candidates are located at the median) and divergent (candidates locate at distinct positions), though only divergent equilibria are robust to free entry. Moreover, two-policy equilibria exist under any distribution of voters' ideal policies, while equilibria with more than two policies exist generically but under restrictive conditions that we characterize. In this sense, our analysis suggests that two-policy equilibria are the most prominent outcomes.

Keywords: Downs, Free Entry, Runoff System, Equilibrium

JEL Classification: D01, D03, D70

Suggested Citation

Brusco, Sandro and Dziubiński, Marcin and Roy, Jaideep, The Hotelling-Downs Model with Runoff Voting (September 2, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1670806 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1670806

Sandro Brusco

SUNY at Stony Brook University, College of Arts and Science, Department of Economics ( email )

Stony Brook, NY 11794
United States

Marcin Dziubiński (Contact Author)

University of Warsaw - Institute of Informatics ( email )

Banacha 2
Warsaw, 02-097
Poland

Jaideep Roy

Deakin University - Department of Economics ( email )

Australia

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