Works Councils and Separations: Voice, Monopoly, and Insurance Effects

27 Pages Posted: 7 Sep 2010

See all articles by Boris Hirsch

Boris Hirsch

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg

Thorsten Schank

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg

Claus Schnabel

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Abstract

Using a large linked employer–employee data set for Germany, we find that the existence of a works council is associated with a lower separation rate to employment, in particular for workers with low tenure. While works council monopoly effects show up in all specifications, clear voice effects are only visible for low tenured workers. Works councils also reduce separations to nonemployment, and this impact is more pronounced for men. Insurance effects only show up for workers with tenure of more than 2 years. Our results indicate that works councils to some extent represent the interests of a specific clientele.

Suggested Citation

Hirsch, Boris and Schank, Thorsten and Schnabel, Claus, Works Councils and Separations: Voice, Monopoly, and Insurance Effects. Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Vol. 49, Issue 4, pp. 566-592, October 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1670982 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-232X.2010.00617.x

Boris Hirsch (Contact Author)

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg ( email )

Schloßplatz 4
Erlangen, DE Bavaria 91054
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.arbeitsmarkt.wiso.uni-erlangen.de/english/hirsch_e.htm

Thorsten Schank

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg ( email )

Schloßplatz 4
Erlangen, DE Bavaria 91054
Germany

Claus Schnabel

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg ( email )

Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
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D-90403 Nuernberg
Germany
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HOME PAGE: http://https://www.arbeitsmarkt.rw.fau.de/english-version/staff/prof-dr-claus-schnabel/

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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