How Groups Reach Agreement in Risky Choices: An Experiment

Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich Working Paper No. 506

37 Pages Posted: 9 Sep 2010

See all articles by Jingjing Zhang

Jingjing Zhang

University of Zurich - Department of Economics

Marco Casari

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Date Written: August 1, 2010

Abstract

This paper studies how groups resolve disagreement in lottery choices. In an experiment, subjects submit individual proposals, exchange chat messages, and must reach unanimity. Overall, group choices are more coherent and closer to risk neutrality than individuals’. The proposal of the minority prevails in about one instance out of five. About one third of the groups do not reach immediate agreement after communication. In these groups, extrovert subjects are more likely to lead the group outcome than confused or conscientious subjects. The amount, equality and timing of chat messages help us to predict which choice prevails in the group.

Suggested Citation

Zhang, Jingjing and Casari, Marco, How Groups Reach Agreement in Risky Choices: An Experiment (August 1, 2010). Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich Working Paper No. 506. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1673178 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1673178

Jingjing Zhang (Contact Author)

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

BlĂĽmlisalpstrasse 10
Zurich, 8006
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.uzh.ch/faculty/zhang.html

Marco Casari

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy

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