Voting When the Stakes are High

43 Pages Posted: 10 Sep 2010 Last revised: 24 Jul 2012

See all articles by Jorgen Juel Andersen

Jorgen Juel Andersen

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Jon H. Fiva

Norwegian School of Management (BI) - Department of Economics

Gisle James James Natvik

BI Norwegian Business School - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 8, 2010

Abstract

Most theories of electoral participation predict that turnout should be higher in elections where more is at stake. We test this prediction, by studying how turnout is affected by exogenous variation in governments' financial flexibility to provide pork for their voters. By utilizing simultaneous elections for different offices, we identify a positive causal effect of election stakes on turnout. An implication is that local fiscal autonomy stimulates local political participation.

Keywords: Voter Motivation, Elections, Turnout

JEL Classification: D72, H71

Suggested Citation

Andersen, Jorgen Juel and Fiva, Jon H. and Natvik, Gisle James James, Voting When the Stakes are High (September 8, 2010). Norges Bank Working Paper 2010/15, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1673819

Jorgen Juel Andersen

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Jon H. Fiva (Contact Author)

Norwegian School of Management (BI) - Department of Economics ( email )

Oslo
Norway

Gisle James James Natvik

BI Norwegian Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

Nydalsveien 37
Oslo, 0484
Norway

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