Common Law and Economic Efficiency

This essay reviews the origins and development of the debate over the “efficiency of the common law hypothesis.” The essay begins with the earliest explanation for the observed tendency of the common law as proffered by Richard Posner. It then examines the Rubin-Priest and contemporary models of demand-side models of common law efficiency and critiques thereof. It then turns to a supply-side analysis of the efficiency of the common law hypothesis, focusing on the nature of the constraints imposed on common law judges and changes in those constraints over time. This essay also examines public choice analysis of the efficiency of the common law and the Austrian economics critique of the standard neoclassical model of analysis.

Keywords: Aranson, Bailey, Buchanan, Claeys, Cooter, Cordato, demand side analysis, Hayek, Hicks, inefficiency, Kaldor, Kornhauser, Krier, legislation, Leoni, liability, O’Driscoll, Parisi, Priest, Pritchard, regulation, Rubin, spending, Stearns, tax, Terrebonne, Tullock, Wangenheim, wealth redistribution

JEL Classification: B20, B25, B53, K00, K40

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Zywicki, Todd J. and Stringham, Edward Peter, Common Law and Economic Efficiency (September 8, 2010). ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, Francesco Parisi, Richard Posner, eds., 2010, George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 10-43, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1673968