The Role of Empirical Assumptions in Economic Analysis: On Facts and Counterfactuals in Economic Law

Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2009

13 Pages Posted: 9 Sep 2010

See all articles by Edward Peter Stringham

Edward Peter Stringham

Trinity College; American Institute for Economic Research

R. Gonzeles

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

How much of economic theory can be derived using pure logic and how much of it depends on empirical facts? In a provocative article, Hülsmann (2003) criticizes Mises and Rothbard for relying on empirical assumptions, ceteris paribus claims, and thought experiments in their analysis. Instead, Hülsmann proposes a counterfactual method that does not rely on any empirical assumptions and is said to produce universally valid claims. Upon inspection we find that many of his proposed laws are either inexact, incorrect, or must rely on subsidiary assumptions to be true. We conclude that the traditional approach of Mises and Rothbard appears to be more fruitful and true.

Keywords: Praxeology, Apriorism, Subsidiary Assumptions, Counterfactuals

Suggested Citation

Stringham, Edward Peter and Gonzeles, R., The Role of Empirical Assumptions in Economic Analysis: On Facts and Counterfactuals in Economic Law (2009). Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1674056

Edward Peter Stringham (Contact Author)

Trinity College ( email )

Hartford, CT 06106
United States

American Institute for Economic Research ( email )

PO Box 1000
Great Barrington, MA 01230
United States

R. Gonzeles

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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