The Syndrome of the Efficiency of the Common Law

52 Pages Posted: 9 Sep 2010 Last revised: 13 Mar 2011

See all articles by Nuno Garoupa

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Carlos Gómez Ligüerre

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Law

Date Written: September 8, 2010

Abstract

Our paper is a methodological critique of the recent legal origins literature. We start by showing that the legal origins cannot be easily based on the efficiency hypothesis of the common law. By debunking the relationship between the efficiency hypothesis of the common law and the legal origins literature, we are left with no consistent theory to explain the alleged inferiority of French civil law.

It is clear that the legal origins literature is based on a particular biased selection of “cherry-picked” legal doctrines. A different selection of “cherry-picked” legal doctrines produces a distinct assessment. We discuss examples that look at substantive law and procedure in the core areas of property, contracts and torts. These are the areas that have been documented to be crucial for economic growth. The second set of examples look at the organization of the legal system and governance. The influence of these variables on economic growth is more controversial, but they have been part of the argument against the efficiency of French civil law. We argue that a careful examination of rules and legal institutions shows that the inefficiency hypothesis of French law is not sustainable under the current framework of comparative law and economics.

Our goal is not to argue that French law is more efficient than common law. Our criticism is essentially methodological. Robust micro-based assessments of rules and legal institutions should prevail over macro generalizations and “cherry-picking” theories that lack a serious theoretical framework. The academic discussion concerning the efficiency superiority of the common law should not overcome the detailed study of legal institutions around the world. Successful legal reforms need to address local problems under local restrictions and specific determinants. In our view, legal reforms based on misperceptions and generalizations are actually detrimental.

Suggested Citation

Garoupa, Nuno and Gómez Ligüerre, Carlos, The Syndrome of the Efficiency of the Common Law (September 8, 2010). Boston University International Law Journal, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2011; U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE10-024; Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 10-23. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1674170

Nuno Garoupa (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Carlos Gómez Ligüerre

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Law ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

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