Overlapping Jurisdictions, Proprietary Communities, and Competition in the Realm of Law

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 162, No. 3, pp. 516-534, September 2006

Posted: 10 Sep 2010

See all articles by Edward Peter Stringham

Edward Peter Stringham

Trinity College; American Institute for Economic Research

Date Written: 2006

Abstract

FREY [2001] and others propose subjecting governments to competition within their jurisdiction, but classical liberals argue that having competing law enforcers cannot work. This article describes a hybrid system that relies on markets but has one law enforcement agency per region, with profit motivated proprietors policing their properties. Vertically integrated proprietary communities wishing to attract customers would need to police their property in a way that patrons desire. Although a monopoly on the use of force would exist, bundling law with real estate makes the law enforcer the residual claimant and creates incentives for them to not to expropriate their clientele.

JEL Classification: D740, H100. K400, L330

Suggested Citation

Stringham, Edward Peter, Overlapping Jurisdictions, Proprietary Communities, and Competition in the Realm of Law (2006). Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 162, No. 3, pp. 516-534, September 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1674470

Edward Peter Stringham (Contact Author)

Trinity College ( email )

Hartford, CT 06106
United States

American Institute for Economic Research ( email )

PO Box 1000
Great Barrington, MA 01230
United States

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