The Competitive Effects of Quantity Discounts

12 Pages Posted: 10 Sep 2010

See all articles by Thomas Randolph Beard

Thomas Randolph Beard

Auburn University - Department of Economics

George S. Ford

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies

David L. Kaserman

Auburn University - Department of Economics

Date Written: 2007

Abstract

From the very earliest antitrust cases to the present, courts have struggled with a fundamental conflict involving contracts between buyers and sellers of intermediate goods. Namely, on the one hand, contractual arrangements binding a buyer to a particular seller frequently are necessary to support efficient exchange and, therefore, are an integral component of a well-functioning market system. But on the other hand, such contracts plausibly can have exclusionary effects, foreclosing potential entrants' access to essential inputs and/or buyers for the duration of the contract.

Keywords: Quantity Discounts, Contracts, Communications, Regulation

JEL Classification: L5

Suggested Citation

Beard, Thomas Randolph and Ford, George S. and Kaserman, David L., The Competitive Effects of Quantity Discounts (2007). Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 52, No. 3, p. 591, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1674547

Thomas Randolph Beard

Auburn University - Department of Economics ( email )

415 W. Magnolia
Auburn, AL 36849-5242
United States

George S. Ford (Contact Author)

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies ( email )

5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 440
Washington, DC 20015
United States

David L. Kaserman

Auburn University - Department of Economics

415 W. Magnolia
Auburn, AL 36849-5242
United States
(334) 844-2905 (Phone)
(334) 844-4615 (Fax)

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