15 Pages Posted: 14 Sep 2010
Date Written: September 11, 2010
In an economic perspective, punitive damages and class actions can be viewed as sharing a common economic function – creating optimal deterrence. Building on Parisi and Cenini (2010), we study the effect of alternative procedural regimes on the effectiveness of punitive damages and class actions. Specifically, we compare the workings of punitive damages and class actions in the American and English (“loser-pays”) regimes. Our findings help explain the limited use and late adoption of class actions and punitive damages in Europe.
Keywords: Punitive Damages, Class Actions, Loser-Pays Rule, Incentives
JEL Classification: K13, K4
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Cenini, Marta and Luppi, Barbara and Parisi, Francesco, Incentive Effects of Class Actions and Punitive Damages Under Alternative Procedural Regimes (September 11, 2010). Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-50. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1675625 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1675625