Dynamic Common Agency

61 Pages Posted: 10 Aug 1999

See all articles by Dirk Bergemann

Dirk Bergemann

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Juuso Valmaki

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: November 1998

Abstract

We consider a general model of dynamic common agency with symmetric information. We focus on Markov perfect equilibria and characterize the equilibrium set for a refinement of the Markov perfect equilibria.

Particular attention is given to the existence of a marginal contribution equilibrium where each principal receives her contribution to the coalition of agent and remaining principals. The structure of the intertemporal payoffs is analyzed in terms of the flow marginal contribution. As a byproduct, new results for the static common agency game are obtained.

The general characterization results are then applied to two dynamic bidding games for a common agent: (i) multi-task allocation and (ii) job matching under uncertainty.

JEL Classification: D81, D82

Suggested Citation

Bergemann, Dirk and Valmaki, Juuso, Dynamic Common Agency (November 1998). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, No. 1206. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=167588

Dirk Bergemann (Contact Author)

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States
203-432-3592 (Phone)
203-432-2128 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirk/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Juuso Valmaki

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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