Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=1676246
 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



Brokers, Bureaucrats, and the Emergence of Financial Markets


Edward Peter Stringham


Trinity College

Peter J. Boettke


George Mason University - Department of Economics

2004

Managerial Finance, Vol. 30, No. 5, pp. 57-71, 2004

Abstract:     
This article provides a critical analysis of Frye (2000) and existing theories of self-governance. Following up on the recent studies by Stringham (2002, 2003), we focus our attention on the emergence of financial markets for several reasons. The common perception is that complicated financial instruments require state sanction to emerge. It is widely argued that in the absence of state regulation of of financial markets, cheating will be common. We maintain, in contrast, that the evidence does not support this pessimistic view. In fact, markets are capable of endogenously generating the rules that govern their operation and these rules discipline cheating severely. Finally, if we can persuasively make the case that self-governance in financial markets is effective - with the complicated nature of transactions that take place - then the argument for self- governance 4eis economic life, we contend, is much stronger than even classical liberalism has led us to believe.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17


Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: September 16, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Stringham, Edward Peter and Boettke, Peter J., Brokers, Bureaucrats, and the Emergence of Financial Markets (2004). Managerial Finance, Vol. 30, No. 5, pp. 57-71, 2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1676246

Contact Information

Edward Peter Stringham (Contact Author)
Trinity College ( email )
United States
Peter J. Boettke
George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-1149 (Phone)
703-993-1133 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 484
Downloads: 30
Citations:  1