The Limits of Constitutional Convergence

21 Pages Posted: 18 Sep 2010 Last revised: 11 Nov 2010

See all articles by Rosalind Dixon

Rosalind Dixon

University of New South Wales (UNSW) - Faculty of Law

Eric A. Posner

University of Chicago - Law School

Date Written: September 15, 2010

Abstract

Globalization, some legal scholars suggest, is a force that makes increasing convergence among different countries’ constitutions more or less inevitable. This Essay explores this hypothesis by analyzing both the logic – and potential limits – to four different mechanisms of constitutional convergence: first, changes in global “superstructure”; second, comparative learning; third, international coercion; and fourth, global competition. For each mechanism, it shows, quite special conditions will in fact be required before global convergence is likely even at the level of legal policy. At a constitutional level, it further suggests, it will be even rarer for these mechanisms to create wholesale convergence. This also has direct implications for ongoing debates over the desirability of constitutional decision-makers seeking to engage in global learning or borrowing.

Suggested Citation

Dixon, Rosalind and Posner, Eric A., The Limits of Constitutional Convergence (September 15, 2010). U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 329. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1677634 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1677634

Rosalind Dixon

University of New South Wales (UNSW) - Faculty of Law ( email )

Kensington, New South Wales 2052
Australia

Eric A. Posner (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0425 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e/

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