18 Pages Posted: 17 Sep 2010
Date Written: September 11, 2010
We provide a simple theoretical model to explain the mechanism whereby privatization of international airports can improve welfare. The model consists of a downstream (airline) duopoly with two inputs (landings at two airports) and two types of consumers. The airline companies compete internationally. Using the simple international duopoly model, we show that the outcome where both airports are privatized is always an equilibrium while that where no airport is privatized is another equilibrium only if the degree of product differentiation is large.
Keywords: Airline, Airport, Privatization, International competition, Vertica lrelations
JEL Classification: L33, L13, R48
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Matsumura, Toshihiro and Matsushima, Noriaki, Airport Privatization and International Competition (September 11, 2010). ISER Discussion Paper No. 792. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1677720 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1677720