Lehman Brothers: Peeking Under the Board Facade

3 Pages Posted: 19 Sep 2010 Last revised: 3 Sep 2013

See all articles by David F. Larcker

David F. Larcker

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business

Brian Tayan

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business

Date Written: June 4, 2010

Abstract

Governance experts place considerable emphasis on structural attributes of the board. Many boards are now indistinguishable in terms of regulatory independence, size, and personal and professional composition. And yet, two companies can look quite similar in terms of board structure and have very different board quality.

Has an emphasis on best practices for board structure led to a decrease in board quality? We explore this question by comparing the board of Lehman Brothers to Goldman Sachs.

Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate Governance and Leadership: The Closer Look series is a collection of short case studies through which we explore topics, issues, and controversies in corporate governance. In each study, we take a targeted look at a specific issue that is relevant to the current debate on governance and explain why it is so important. Larcker and Tayan are co-authors of the book Corporate Governance Matters, and A Real Look at Real World Corporate Governance.

Keywords: board of directors, board structure, corporate governance, regulatory oversight

JEL Classification: G30, G34

Suggested Citation

Larcker, David F. and Tayan, Brian, Lehman Brothers: Peeking Under the Board Facade (June 4, 2010). Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Closer Look Series: Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate Governance No. CGRP-03 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1678044

David F. Larcker (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )

Graduate School of Business
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-725-6159 (Phone)

Brian Tayan

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

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