A Historical Look at Compensation and Disclosure: Cool and Refreshing!

6 Pages Posted: 19 Sep 2010 Last revised: 3 Sep 2013

David F. Larcker

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business

Brian Tayan

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business

Date Written: June 15, 2010

Abstract

Compensation and Disclosure.

Compensation packages are intended to attract, retain, and motivate executives to perform in accordance with the long-term financial objectives of shareholders. Disclosure in the annual proxy is expected to be “clear, concise, and understandable.” And yet in recent years, compensation packages have grown increasingly complex in design and disclosure has grown correspondingly difficult to understand.

We explore this issue by comparing the compensation and disclosure of Lorillard in 1948 to that of 2009.

Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate Governance and Leadership: The Closer Look series is a collection of short case studies through which we explore topics, issues, and controversies in corporate governance. In each study, we take a targeted look at a specific issue that is relevant to the current debate on governance and explain why it is so important. Larcker and Tayan are co-authors of the book Corporate Governance Matters, and A Real Look at Real World Corporate Governance.

Keywords: board of directors, board structure, corporate governance, regulatory oversight

JEL Classification: G30, G34

Suggested Citation

Larcker, David F. and Tayan, Brian, A Historical Look at Compensation and Disclosure: Cool and Refreshing! (June 15, 2010). Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Closer Look Series: Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate Governance No. CGRP-04 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1678051

David F. Larcker (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )

Graduate School of Business
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-725-6159 (Phone)

Brian Tayan

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

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