CEO Succession Planning: Who’s Behind Door Number One?

7 Pages Posted: 18 Sep 2010 Last revised: 3 Sep 2013

See all articles by David F. Larcker

David F. Larcker

Stanford Graduate School of Business; Stanford University - Hoover Institution; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Brian Tayan

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business

Date Written: June 24, 2010

Abstract

One of the most important decisions that a board of directors must make is the selection of the CEO of the company. And yet survey data indicates that many boards are not prepared for this process.

In recent years, shareholder groups have pressured boards to increase transparency about their succession plans. While the SEC initially allowed companies to exclude from the proxy shareholder proposals that would require more disclosure, the agency has since reversed its position.

What type of disclosure can provide shareholders with insight into succession planning?

Related teaching case ($): Multimillionaire Matchmaker: An Inside Look at CEO Succession Planning (SSRN), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1593231.

Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate Governance and Leadership: The Closer Look series is a collection of short case studies through which we explore topics, issues, and controversies in corporate governance. In each study, we take a targeted look at a specific issue that is relevant to the current debate on governance and explain why it is so important. Larcker and Tayan are co-authors of the book Corporate Governance Matters, and A Real Look at Real World Corporate Governance.

Keywords: succession planning, disclosure, board of directors, corporate governance

JEL Classification: G30, G34

Suggested Citation

Larcker, David F. and Tayan, Brian, CEO Succession Planning: Who’s Behind Door Number One? (June 24, 2010). Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Closer Look Series: Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate Governance No. CGRP-05 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1678062

David F. Larcker (Contact Author)

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

Graduate School of Business
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-725-6159 (Phone)

Stanford University - Hoover Institution ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Brian Tayan

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

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