Where Do Firms Issue Debt? An Empirical Analysis of Issuer Location and Regulatory Competition in Europe

43 Pages Posted: 10 Oct 2010

See all articles by Horst Eidenmueller

Horst Eidenmueller

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Andreas Engert

Freie Universität Berlin, Department of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Lars Hornuf

Technische Universität Dresden; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: September 1, 2010

Abstract

In this article, we study the choice of issuer location and regulatory competition in the European corporate debt market. We find that, in absolute terms, Germany has by far the highest outflow of debt issues, while the Netherlands, the UK, Luxembourg and Ireland see the most inflows (in that order). We use a panel gravity model to investigate country specific factors attracting foreign subsidiaries as issuer. The data clearly support the prediction that the locational choice is positively influenced by a low withholding tax rate. There is also some evidence that corporate tax rates play a role. We do not find support for creditor protection rules in bankruptcy as a driver of cross-border debt securities issues. Hence, countries who wish to attract issuers are well-advised to reduce their withholding tax rates – creditor rights seem not to matter.

Keywords: debt securities, corporate bonds, external finance, regulatory competition, tax competition, legal arbitrage, multinational corporations, subsidiaries

JEL Classification: K12, K22, G18, G33

Suggested Citation

Eidenmueller, Horst G. M. and Engert, Andreas and Hornuf, Lars, Where Do Firms Issue Debt? An Empirical Analysis of Issuer Location and Regulatory Competition in Europe (September 1, 2010). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 292/2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1678442 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1678442

Horst G. M. Eidenmueller

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )

St Cross Building
St Cross Road
Oxford, OX1 3UL
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Andreas Engert (Contact Author)

Freie Universität Berlin, Department of Law ( email )

Boltzmannstr. 3
Berlin, 14195
Germany

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Lars Hornuf

Technische Universität Dresden ( email )

Dresden, 01307
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.hornuf.com

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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