On Mandatory Deposits, Fines, and the Control of Litter

13 Pages Posted: 19 Sep 2010

See all articles by Dwight Lee

Dwight Lee

University of Georgia - C. Herman and Mary Virginia Terry College of Business - Department of Economics

Philip E. Graves

University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics

Robert L. Sexton

Pepperdine University - Economics Department

Date Written: 1988

Abstract

Mandatory deposits on beverage containers have received enthusiastic support among environmentalists as a means of controlling litter. In modeling the effects of a deposit on litter generation and recovery it is found that this enthusiasm is well justified. Interestingly enough, few supporters of deposits seem to realize how justified their support is, as evidenced by their lack of enthusiasm for eliminating the littering fine which serves to dilute the effectiveness of the deposit. The most efficient solution possible when a fine is combined with a deposit is shown to require less littering, but more litter, than is an efficient solution when relying entirely on the deposit.

Keywords: litter, environmental fines, environmental deposits, mandatory deposits, control of litter

JEL Classification: Q28, Q51, Q52, Q58

Suggested Citation

Lee, Dwight and Graves, Philip E. and Sexton, Robert L., On Mandatory Deposits, Fines, and the Control of Litter (1988). Natural Resources Journal, Vol. 28, No. 4, p. 837, 1988. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1679193

Dwight Lee

University of Georgia - C. Herman and Mary Virginia Terry College of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

Athens, GA 30602-6254
United States

Philip E. Graves (Contact Author)

University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics ( email )

Campus Box 256
Boulder, CO 80309-0256
United States

Robert L. Sexton

Pepperdine University - Economics Department ( email )

24255 Pacific Coast Highway
Malibu, CA 90263
United States

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