Political Contestability, Capture, and Knowledge Transfer in Municipal Public-Private Partnerships

24 Pages Posted: 21 Sep 2010 Last revised: 4 Feb 2015

See all articles by Marian W. Moszoro

Marian W. Moszoro

Warsaw School of Economics (SGH); International Monetary Fund (IMF); George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science (ICES)

Date Written: January 16, 2015

Abstract

Contractual flexibility in public-private partnerships increases plausible political contestability and industry capture. The anticipation of political hazards, hold-up, and knowledge-transfer barriers redounds to regulatory and contractual rigidities that reduce managerial efficiency and often impede implementing public-private partnerships. Based on 20 projects embarked upon by the city of Warsaw, I examine the management of public-private partnerships in emerging economies to minimize political hazards and contractual inefficiencies. Key policy implications are (1) integrated headquarters, (2) accountable project selection criteria, (3) involvement of consultants to legitimize the process to subsequent administrations, (4) ex ante risk allocation and ex post performance measurement procedures, (5) predetermined termination clauses, (6) commitment to learning-by-doing, and (7) established knowledge transfer and retention mechanisms. Thereby, modern public management of public-private arrangements requires balancing service provision efficiency and political hazards from interested third parties.

Keywords: Public-private partnerships, governance of public-private multi-actor relationships, innovative organizational design, local governments, emerging markets

JEL Classification: H11, H75, L32, L43, L51

Suggested Citation

Moszoro, Marian W., Political Contestability, Capture, and Knowledge Transfer in Municipal Public-Private Partnerships (January 16, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1679995 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1679995

Marian W. Moszoro (Contact Author)

Warsaw School of Economics (SGH) ( email )

aleja Niepodleglosci 162
PL-Warsaw, 02-554
Poland

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

HOME PAGE: http://economics.gmu.edu/people/mmoszoro

George Mason University - Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science (ICES) ( email )

400P Truland Building
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

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