N-Person Nonconvex Bargaining: Efficient Proportional Solutions
10 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2010
Date Written: September 21, 2010
Abstract
For n-person bargaining problems the family of proportional solutions (introduced and characterized by Kalai) is generalized to bargaining problems with non-convex payoff sets. The so-called “efficient proportional solutions”are characterized axiomatically using natural extensions of the original axioms provided by Kalai.
Keywords: n-person, non-convex bargaining, proportional solutions, egalitarian solution
JEL Classification: C78
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Hougaard, Jens Leth and Tvede, Mich Palle, N-Person Nonconvex Bargaining: Efficient Proportional Solutions (September 21, 2010). University of Copenhagen Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 10-21, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1680365 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1680365
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