N-Person Nonconvex Bargaining: Efficient Proportional Solutions

10 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2010

See all articles by Jens Leth Hougaard

Jens Leth Hougaard

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics

Mich Tvede

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 21, 2010

Abstract

For n-person bargaining problems the family of proportional solutions (introduced and characterized by Kalai) is generalized to bargaining problems with non-convex payoff sets. The so-called “efficient proportional solutions”are characterized axiomatically using natural extensions of the original axioms provided by Kalai.

Keywords: n-person, non-convex bargaining, proportional solutions, egalitarian solution

JEL Classification: C78

Suggested Citation

Hougaard, Jens Leth and Tvede, Mich Palle, N-Person Nonconvex Bargaining: Efficient Proportional Solutions (September 21, 2010). University of Copenhagen Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 10-21, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1680365 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1680365

Jens Leth Hougaard

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Øster Farimagsgade 5
Bygning 26
1353 Copenhagen K.
Denmark

Mich Palle Tvede (Contact Author)

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Øster Farimagsgade 5
Bygning 26
1353 Copenhagen K.
Denmark
45 35 32 30 92 (Phone)
45 35 32 30 85 (Fax)

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