Searle's Critique of the Multiple Drafts Model of Consciousness

Searle's Critique of the Multiple Drafts Model of Consciousness, Facta Universitatis, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 173-182, 2009

10 Pages Posted: 22 Sep 2010

See all articles by Djordje Vidanovic

Djordje Vidanovic

University of Niš, Faculty of Philosophy

Date Written: September 21, 2010

Abstract

In this paper I try to show the limitations of John Searle's critique of Daniel Dennett's conception of consciousness based on the idea that the computational architecture of consciousness is patterned on the simple replicating units of information called memes. Searle claims that memes cannot substitute virtual genes as expounded by Dennett, saying that the spread of ideas and information is not driven by "blind forces" but has to be intentional. In this paper I try to refute his argumentation by a detailed account that tries to prove that intentionality need not be invoked in accounts of memes (and consciousness).

Keywords: Searle, Dennett, Multiple Drafts Model, consciousness, genes, memes

Suggested Citation

Vidanovic, Djordje, Searle's Critique of the Multiple Drafts Model of Consciousness (September 21, 2010). Searle's Critique of the Multiple Drafts Model of Consciousness, Facta Universitatis, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 173-182, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1680505

Djordje Vidanovic (Contact Author)

University of Niš, Faculty of Philosophy ( email )

Cirila i Metodija 2
18000 Niš
Niš, 18000
Republic of Serbia

HOME PAGE: http://www.ni.ac.rs

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