Searle's Critique of the Multiple Drafts Model of Consciousness
Searle's Critique of the Multiple Drafts Model of Consciousness, Facta Universitatis, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 173-182, 2009
10 Pages Posted: 22 Sep 2010
Date Written: September 21, 2010
In this paper I try to show the limitations of John Searle's critique of Daniel Dennett's conception of consciousness based on the idea that the computational architecture of consciousness is patterned on the simple replicating units of information called memes. Searle claims that memes cannot substitute virtual genes as expounded by Dennett, saying that the spread of ideas and information is not driven by "blind forces" but has to be intentional. In this paper I try to refute his argumentation by a detailed account that tries to prove that intentionality need not be invoked in accounts of memes (and consciousness).
Keywords: Searle, Dennett, Multiple Drafts Model, consciousness, genes, memes
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