Financial Disclosure and the Board: A Case for Non-Independent Directors

Posted: 21 Oct 2010 Last revised: 23 Oct 2010

See all articles by Yuri Biondi

Yuri Biondi

French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)

Pierpaolo Giannoccolo

University of Bologna

Antoine Reberioux

Université Paris VII Denis Diderot; University Antilles Guyane - Faculty of Law and Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 22, 2010

Abstract

In listed companies, the Board of directors has ultimate responsibility for information disclosure. The conventional wisdom is that director independence is an essential factor in improving the quality of that disclosure. In a sense, this approach subordinates expertise to independence. We argue that effective certification may require firm-specific expertise, in particular for intangible-intensive business models. However, this latter form of expertise is negatively related to independence as it is commonly measured and evaluated. Accordingly, there exists an optimal share of independent directors for each company, related to the level of intangible resources.

Keywords: Board of directors, information disclosure, accounting, intangible resources

JEL Classification: G30, M21, D80, M41

Suggested Citation

Biondi, Yuri and Giannoccolo, Pierpaolo and Reberioux, Antoine, Financial Disclosure and the Board: A Case for Non-Independent Directors (September 22, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1680826 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1680826

Yuri Biondi (Contact Author)

French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) ( email )

IRISSO - University Paris Dauphine PSL
Place Marechal Lattre Tassigny
75016 Paris
France

HOME PAGE: http://yuri.biondi.free.fr/

Pierpaolo Giannoccolo

University of Bologna ( email )

Department of Economics
Piazza Scaravilli, 2
40125 Bologna, 40125
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www2.dse.unibo.it/giannoccolo

Antoine Reberioux

Université Paris VII Denis Diderot

2, place Jussieu
Paris, 75005
France

University Antilles Guyane - Faculty of Law and Economics ( email )

Pointe à Pitre
France

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