Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 709
16 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2010
Date Written: July 6, 2010
A popular way of obtaining essential inputs requires the establishment of an input production joint venture (IPJV) in the upstream (U) section of the vertical chain of production by firms competing and selling final goods in the downstream (D) section of the vertical chain. In spite of the apparently simple arrangement there are many possible governances for the management of the IPJV according to the ownership structure and to the degree of delegation granted to the IPJV by parent firms. We explore the best sustainable governance arrangement for the IPJV. We address this question in a duopoly framework and we find a large area of impossible vertical arrangements associated with technological asymmetry. The most likely governance of the vertical arrangement associated to the IPJV is total independence.
Keywords: Input Production Joint Venture, Horizontal Differentiation, Oligopoly, Delegation, Bargaining
JEL Classification: L24, L42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Rossini, Gianpaolo and Vergari, Cecilia, Pitfalls in Vertical Arrangements (July 6, 2010). Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 709. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1681494 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1681494